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Abstract 
This article works with theory of ritual in order to begin addressing a series of questions 
raised by Brazilian spirit possession rituals (in Kardecism and Umbanda). Four 
contributions to theory of ritual highlight relevant conceptual issues: Humphrey and 
Laidlaw on non-intentionality; Bloch on deference; Houseman and Severi on social 
relations; and Kapferer on virtuality. Strawson’s philosophical distinction between 
objective and reactive attitudes toward intentionality is used to make a case (i) that 
certain formal aspects of ritual (indexicals) serve to (ii) mark culturally-variable 
attitudes to agency within rituals, which are related to, but fundamentally distinct from, 
non-ritual attitudes to agency. 
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Recent theory of ritual has been moving past linguistic communication models that 
emphasize the symbolism of rituals and that attempt to read their syntax and semantics. 
This article makes a specific theoretical contribution that draws together themes from 
recent work on theorizing rituals. The first section of the article offers a brief overview 
of two Brazilian religions, Umbanda and Kardecism. Highlighting the interrelations 
between spirit possession and social relations raises a series of questions. The 
theoretical perspective set out in the following sections suggests a means of answering 
these questions. The second section sketches four contributions to theory of ritual: 
Humphrey and Laidlaw on non-intentionality; Bloch on deference; Houseman and 
Severi on social relations; and Kapferer on virtuality. The third section draws on the 
work of philosopher Peter Strawson to distinguish two distinct attitudes toward agency, 
reactive and objective. This article’s most significant contribution is to argue that rituals 
help to reframe the relation between these attitudes in a manner distinct from their 
relation in non-ritual contexts. By focusing on this relational tension we turn our 
attention from reading the meaning of ritual to the structure and dynamics of ritual 
practice and how these reframe agency. I illustrate the ramifications of this distinct by 
examining its relations with the four contributions to theory of ritual discussed in the 
previous section. The fourth section draws critically on the work of Alfred Gell to argue 
that the Peircean concept of indexicality is invaluable in analyzing which elements and 
aspects of ritualized action achieve these attitudinal effects. The resulting theoretical 
frame emphasizes agency, virtuality and indexicality in ritual within specific social 
contexts. This will be illustrated, in the fifth and final section, by an analysis of spirit 
possession in Kardecism and Umbanda.  
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I make three general claims. First, the balance between reactive and objective 
attitudes to agency is transformed in the case of ritualized actions. Second, this 
constitutes in important aspect of ritual virtuality, of i.e., of ritual’s ability to create an 
altered set of social relations, “a space in which participants can reimagine (and redirect 
or reorient themselves) into the everyday circumstances of life” (Kapferer 2004: 47). 
Third, the fact that certain elements of ritual function as indexes (in the Peircean sense) 
is crucial to this process. That is, some aspects of ritualized actions can only be 
understood within, and insofar as they point to, their specific context. The words ‘this’ 
and ‘now’ are indexical because their meaning, and the truth-value of sentences in 
which they are found, can only be fully determined with sufficient knowledge of the 
context in which they are uttered. My thesis is as follows: certain sorts of ‘thisness’ 
found in spirit possession rituals in Brazil alter the tension between reactive and 
objective attitudes; this naturalizes the agency of supernatural agents; and the virtuality 
of these rituals both rehearses and inserts this transformed agency into broader social 
relations of reciprocity. 
 
Spirit Possession and Social Relations in Kardecism and Umbanda 
 
Spirit possession is important in several areas of the Brazilian religious landscape: folk 
religion; Pentecostalism and Neo-Pentecostalism; the Catholic charismatic revival; 
Afro-Brazilian religions; Kardecism or Spiritism, a French-import with roots in 
nineteenth-century American Spiritualism; and Umbanda, a twentieth-century mixture 
of Afro-Brazilian religions and Kardecism. I focus on the latter two, though related 
claims could be argued regarding the others. Kardecism and Umbanda manifest a range 
of possession phenomena, including spirit mediumship of different types, voluntary 
cultic possessions that involve long-term relationships between a given medium and a 
given spirit, involuntary possession by these same or similar spirits of ritual participants 
and observers, and malevolent possession, which is treated as an important cause of 
physical and mental illness. I focus on spirit mediumship and voluntary cultic 
possessions, which manifest a clearer relation to the broader field of Brazilian social 
relations. A brief overview of these two religions will raise questions that highlight the 
potential value of certain conceptual and theoretical resources. 
 Kardecism is a descendent of nineteenth-century French Spiritualism (Bastide 
1967; Aubrée and Laplantine 1990; Hess 1991; Sharp 2006; Monroe 2008) Umbanda is 
a mixture of Kardecism with Afro-Brazilian traditions (Brumana and Martinez 1989; 
Brown 1994). Kardecism is an urban, middle-class religion, with a highly educated 
membership among Brazilian religions (Pierucci and Prandi 2000: 633). Umbanda is a 
distinctively Brazilian religion, formed in the 1920s and 1930s as a mixture of Afro-
Brazilian traditions and Kardecism. Although census results are especially problematic 
in Brazil, given the high degree of multiple adherence and syncretism, the basic 
numbers give us a useful sense of the scope of these two religions (Jacob et al. 2003: 
101-105). In the 2000 census, 2.2 million Brazilians self-identified as Kardecists and 
397,000 as Umbandists. (Candomblé, the largest of the Afro-Brazilian traditions, is 
much smaller, with only 118,000 Brazilians claiming this as their primary religious 
affiliation.)  
Kardecism’s beliefs include reincarnation, karma, the universal spiritual 
evolution of humankind, the practicability and value of communication with more 
evolved spirits (including Jesus Christ), a plurality and hierarchy of worlds, a 
transcendent God, and as an exceptionally evolved spirit. Key rituals include textual 
study sessions, consultation with or reception of messages from spirits received by 
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mediums (through oral communication, automatic writing or other means), the “passe” 
(a form of blessing similar to New Age cleansing of the aura), and rituals of 
“disobsession” conducted to free people from the pernicious influences of confused or 
un-evolved spirits.  
Three distinctly Brazilian characteristics of Kardecism stand out. First, since its 
inception, Kardecism in Brazil has been more religious than in France, where its 
“empirical” and scientific nature was emphasized (Warren 1968: 397; Machado 1983: 
114; Stoll 1999: 41). Second, it has reflected Brazilian racial beliefs, above all rejecting 
black and native spirits as non-evolved, a key element in the tensions that led to the 
emergence of Umbanda as a separate religion in the early twentieth-century (Brown 
1985: 11). Third, it posits a specifically Brazilian conception of the superior, more 
highly evolved nature of the spirit guides and the worlds or “colonies” in which they 
live (Xavier 2006a; 2006b; see F.L. Silva 2005). In its new home, Kardecism received a 
distinctly Brazilian emphasis, reflecting specific concepts of religion, race, and social 
hierarchy. 
The origin of Umbanda is closely tied to issues of race and class. This fact is 
basic to understanding how it came to be that Umbanda occupies a spectrum of 
doctrinal and ritual positions between Kardecism and the Afro-Brazilian traditions like 
Candomblé, with individual groups varying widely in their balance between the 
characteristics of these two extremes (Engler forthcoming). Three tendencies, reflecting 
the Brazilian myth of three races (DaMatta 1987: 58-85), were present in the formation 
of Umbanda and continue to influence its development (Brown 1977; Brown and Bick 
1987).  
First, Spiritists looked to Afro-Brazilian traditions for a more intensely 
emotional and corporeally satisfying symbolism and ritual, leading to the 
empretecimento of Kardecism (Ortiz 1999, 40-45). This view is reflected in historical 
accounts that focus on the role of white middle-class kardecists as leaders of the 
merging religion, portraying Umbanda as originating in a middle-class empretecimento 
of Kardecism.  
Second, analyses that focus on social and demographic factors place greater 
emphasis on the movement in the other direction, from Afro-Brazilian traditions 
towards Kardecism (Brown 1977). Candomblé was the most important Afro-Brazilian 
tradition in this context. Its key rituals include initiation, divination, and the roda-de-
santo (saint wheel) in which initiated members dance counter-clockwise, to intensely 
syncopated drumming, until they enter into a trance state, becoming cavalos (horses) for 
the orixás. This model of possession remains prominent in some Umbanda terreiros but 
is not found in Kardecism. Two factors led, in the late nineteenth century, to the 
embranquecimento of Candomblé and other Afro-Brazilian traditions, primarily in Rio 
de Janeiro and São Paulo: (i) the influence and Spiritism and elements of Catholicism 
on the lower classes, which the led to the formation of a “low Spiritism”; and (ii) the 
presence of increasing numbers of white members, often new immigrants, in the Afro-
Brazilian traditions (Camargo 1961, 34-35; Ortiz 1999, 34-40). Edison Carneiro’s study 
of Afro-Brazilian religions in Bahia, primarily in the 1930s, for example, found spiritist 
ideas being absorbed into Candomblé de Caboclo, a tradition already incorporating both 
African and indigenous elements (Carneiro 1977: 73-74; Ortiz 1999, 36). 
Third, indigenous figures played an important role in the emergence of 
Umbanda. Kardecist mediums began to receive the spirits of Brazilian Indians in the 
1920s. These caboclos was rejected by some as less evolved. Their presence continues 
to be an important marker distinguishing Kardecism from Umbanda (Concone 2001; 
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Motta de Oliveira 2007). Caboclos are also present in some Afro-Brazilian traditions 
(Boyer 1992; Santos 1992, 1995; Harding 2005: 122; Prandi 2005: 121-138). 
 There are a number of significant differences between Kardecism and Umbanda 
(Camargo 1961; Aubrée and Laplantine 1990: 179-184; Brown 1994: 15-25; V.G. Silva 
2005: 99-127; Lewgoy 2006). In general, Kardecism is predominantly a middle-class 
religion. It is much more centralized institutionally and formally coherent in doctrine 
and practice. It has a strong emphasis on textuality, with highly literate members, a 
larger range of publications, and a central role for spirit writing as a ritual form. Afro-
Brazilian religions tend to be lower class, widely diffuse in belief and practice, and 
orally based. Umbanda occupies a spectrum between Kardecism and the Afro-Brazilian 
traditions in all these senses. With few institutionally imposed or maintained norms, 
individual Umbanda terreiros manifests a spectrum of doctrinal and ritual 
characteristics, from Umbanda branca (“white” Umbanda), that resembles Kardecism, 
to a more Africanized Umbanda that resembles Candomblé and other Afro-Brazilian 
religions. The former has a higher proportion of white and middle-class members and 
the latter includes a greater proportion of black and lower-class members. (It is 
important to keep in mind that race in Brazil is a complex issue, with tensions less 
sharply defined than in other areas of Latin America [Lovell and Wood 1998; Hoffman 
and Centeno 2003; Fischer 2004])  
On the other hand, there are important ritual similarities between the two 
religions, including the predominance of women as participants (though of men in 
leadership roles), the passe or laying on of hands (more common in Kardecism), and the 
blessing of items such as T-shirts and medallions, given to infants and the sick for the 
purposes of protection and cure (more common in Umbanda). 
There are several important differences, in general, between rituals in Kardecism 
and Umbanda. In most of these cases, Umbanda terreiros at the “white” or Kardecist 
end of the spectrum manifest these differences to a lesser extent and those at the African 
end of the spectrum to a greater extent.  
First, during possession rituals, Kardecist mediums remain fully or partially 
conscious of themselves as distinct from the spirits that they receive, whereas, in 
Umbanda, the medium, or cavalo, normally enters a classic trance state, sometimes so 
deep as to require additional rituals to end the possession.  
Second, Kardecist mediums receive “evolved” spirits, often middle-class 
professionals like doctors, lawyers and intellectuals; they reject black and native spirits 
as non-evolved. In Umbanda, the two most common types of spirits are marginal 
figures: caboclos and preto-velhos (indigenous and black spirits respectively, central in 
this religion but ‘marginal’ in terms of dominant social evaluations and access to socio-
economic opportunities). Participants are also often possessed by orixás (the divinities 
of Candomblé) and by exus, a type of trickster or demonic figure present in Candomblé 
but which seldom possesses members of that religion.  
Third, Kardecist rituals are often text-centered, unlike Umbanda. Doctrinal 
knowledge is central. Most Centers have a bookstall that sells Kardecist literature, 
including the books currently being used in the weekly study sessions.  
Fourth, where Kardecists will often return home from the Center with a reading 
assignment, Umbandist are often told by the spirits they consult to perform additional 
rituals at home, often involving lighting candles in a carefully prepared environment 
with symbolic substances, colors and the presence of running water.  
Fifth, Kardecists have a more fluid and democratic hierarchy. Meetings are 
generally led by a senior male, echoing Protestant congregations. Newcomers begin by 
attending study sessions and only slowly graduate to attending rituals where spirits are 
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received or patients disobsessed. Umbandists have a more rigid hierarchy of 
mediumship and a sharp line, doctrinally and as inscribed in the ritual space, between 
clients and mediums.  
Sixth, Kardecists dress like they were going to a Christian church. Umbandist 
clients prefer white and avoid black. Mediums are distinguished by more elaborate 
forms of dress, with variations that mark different types and levels of mediums. These 
markers are more obvious at the African end of the spectrum where mediums place 
greater emphasis on donning the clothing and taking up the artifacts associated with the 
particular type of spirit that possesses them. 
Seventh, Umbanda more explicitly reflects Brazilian social relations. Peter Fry 
argues that Umbanda reflects the social and political structures of Brazilian society:  
Umbanda is plausible insofar as the personal relations established with the 
spirits, in hopes of obtaining favours, are homologous with the real relations 
established for people’s benefit in the broader social system. ... Umbanda ... is a 
ritual dramatization of the principles that govern life in the large cities of 
Brazil.... Umbanda is a ritualized and dramatized metaphor that refers to Brazil’s 
social and political reality (1978: 45, 47).  
 
Concone notes that the religion’s various spirits “are obviously drawn from the national 
reality” (2001: 282). Brumana and Martinez characterize Umbanda as a “subaltern cult” 
that “elaborates symbolically the social condition of the client” (1989: 45). Ortiz argues 
that “umbandist ideology preserves and transforms Afro-Brazilian cultural elements 
within a modern society, [while, at the same time] manifesting rupture, forgetting, and 
reinterpretation of older, traditional values” (1999[1978]: 212). Patricia Birman 
underlines Umbanda’s symbolic and ritual engagement with Brazilian social reality: 
“umbandist possession … is worthy of credit to the extent that it contextually invokes 
its relation with the world as experienced by its audience” (1995: 44-45). This complex 
refraction of Brazilian social relations in Umbanda is not found to the same extent in 
Kardecism, where issues of hierarchy work themselves out more in the traditional 
rhetoric of institutional politics. That is, in Kardecism’s hierarchical and meritocratic 
view of spiritual progress is reflected in the relative absence of tensions between 
personal and impersonal modes of authority. 
Eighth, and finally, this tendency of Umbanda to more closely reflect tensions 
within the hierarchical relations of Brazilian society, while at the same time standing 
apart from the economic sphere, is correlated with its greater openness to a range of 
conceptions of gender and sexuality (Landes 1947; Fry 1982; Birman 1982; 1985; 1995; 
Natividade and Oliveira 2007). 
Several issue emerge as targets for potential explanation and interpretation. The 
historical importance of issues of race and class in relations between Kardecism and 
Umbanda, and the parallels between aspects of these religions and specific 
characteristics of Brazilian social relations underline the need to foreground these 
contextual dimensions. Differences between the two religions, in terms of class 
position, leadership and institutional structures, literacy, textuality, types of possession 
states, etc. might make sense in terms of some relation to this context; on the other 
hand, differences in ritual form must be kept clearly in mind. 
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Marshalling Theoretical Resources 
 
The view that ritual is communication has important precedents, e.g., Durkheim, Leach, 
van Gennep, Geertz, and Turner. This broad set of approaches holds that ritual conveys 
meaning like language does: by referring—albeit less literally, more symbolically—to 
something other than itself. This approach has trouble dealing with the efficacy and 
dynamics of rituals as well as with discrepancies among insider interpretations of rituals 
and between those of insiders and scholars. As a result, key recent works emphasize 
formal aspects of ritual (e.g., Laidlaw and Humphrey 2006; Kreinath 2006; Severi 
2006). Fritz Staal marked an extreme: “A widespread but erroneous assumption about 
ritual is that it consists in symbolic activities which refer to something else. It is 
characteristic of a ritual performance, however, that it is self-contained and self-
absorbed. … Ritual is pure activity, without meaning or goal” (Staal 1979: 3, 9). 
As I tried to make sense of Brazilian spirit-possession rituals, I found many 
traditional approaches to theorizing rituals to be problematic. Issues like who is agent 
and who patient, who sender and who receiver, who performer and who audience 
opened up fascinating dimensions of ambivalence. My attempts to make sense of what I 
saw were challenged by the dynamism of the rituals and the variety of interpretive 
positions that reflect and shape them. After much reading and thought, I found a number 
of recent theoretical approaches to be especially valuable: certain features of the case, 
seemed best characterized in terms of certain key concepts, and these in turn seemed 
more amenable to certain theoretical approaches. My approach to working with theory 
of ritual converged on what Jens Kreinath, Jan Snoek, and Michael Stausberg call 
“Theorizing Rituals,” a theoretically pluralistic approach, drawing on multiple 
perspectives in a methodologically open and reflexive manner, and that foregrounds a 
dynamic interplay between paradigmatic concepts and theoretical affiliations (2006; cf. 
Engler 2008: 25-27). Four approaches emerged as particaulr useful. 
First, Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw make the relation between ritual 
and intentionality central to “contrasting ritualized action with action which is not 
ritualized” (1994: 2). Less radical than Staal, they hold that rituals are learned purely as 
sequences of actions and that meanings are applied to them after the fact. They argue 
that ritual transforms the relation between action and intentionality: the “ritualization of 
action” … consists in it becoming non-intentional, stipulated, and elemental or 
archetypal” (Laidlaw and Humphrey 2006: 278) That is, rituals effectively disengage 
the form of intentionality associated with action in non-ritual contexts: ritual actions are 
not intended in the same way that non-ritual actions are. This reflects the fact that rituals 
stipulate a sequence of actions that stands prior to the individual ritual actor. This results 
in its perceived elemental or archetypal quality. The ‘non-intentionality’ of ritual is the 
first concept I draw on below. 
Second, Maurice Bloch helped to clarify this link between non-intentionality and 
the archetypal quality of ritualized action. He agrees that intentionality is displaced 
when action is ritualized: “any act … that appears to originate fully from the actor 
cannot properly be called ritual” (Bloch 2006: 496). He clarifies this by noting that 
rituals involve extensive quotation or deference, that is, “reliance on the authority of 
others to guarantee the value of what is said or done” (Bloch 2006: 497). In this light, 
tradition serves as a “phantasmogoric quasi-person” that guides ritual regardless of 
individual intentions (Bloch 2006: 504). Bloch echoes Humphrey and Laidlaw 
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regarding the non-intentional, stipulated, and archetypal quality of ritualized action, but 
he is more specific regarding the cognitive mechanism involved. He also offers a more 
explicit bridge to discussions of one of the psychological functions of ritual: “when one 
is in trouble and does not know what to do, one allows oneself to be taken over by the 
knowledge and the authority of others” (Bloch 2006: 506). This provides a second 
insight that I will draw on: displacement of intentionality is not simply characteristic of 
ritual in a descriptive sense; it has functional and even strategic dimensions.  
Third, like Humphrey and Laidlaw, Michael Houseman and Carlo Severi (1998) 
focus on the organizational features of ritual action, not on issues of meaning. More 
specifically, they focus on the social context that ritual creates: “[I]t is the form of the 
relational field in which the protagonists are engaged which underlies the establishment 
of a context specific to ritual behaviour” (Houseman and Severi 1998: 167). They argue 
that ritual acts out special relationships, and that this is what sets it apart from non-
ritualized action: “To the degree that ritual performances incorporate … exceptional 
situations, they become readily recognizable as distinct from everyday interaction: they 
cannot be fully accounted for in terms of ordinary internalities and patterns of 
relationship” (Houseman 2006: 418-419). This third insight places the first two other in 
a social context, raising the possibility that shifts in intentionality both reflect and 
reconstitute social relations. 
Fourth, Bruce Kapferer goes further in specifying the relationship between ritual 
and non-ritual fields of social relations. He similarly focuses on “ritual as a technical 
practice rather than a representational formation” (2006: 672). He argues that ritual, due 
to its ‘virtuality,’ allows participants to exercise their agency in 
 
a self-contained imaginal space—… a construction that enables participants to 
break free from the constraints or determinations of everyday life…. The 
phantasmagoric space of ritual virtuality may be conceived as a space … whose 
dynamic not only interrupts prior determining processes but also ... [within] 
which participants can reimagine (and redirect or reorient themselves) in the 
everyday circumstances of life (Kapferer 2006: 673-674; cf. 2004: 47). 
 
Ritual is not subordinate to non-ritual nor does it simply represent it. Ritual’s difference 
allows participants to act differently; it similarity allows them to bring that distinct 
agency into play in the non-ritual sphere. This fourth insight draws together the others 
in suggesting that the distinct social field constituted in and through ritual can be 
characterized by its virtuality, not entirely unlike yet not reducible to the sphere of non-
ritual relations, and providing a space within which participants reimagine, redirect or 
reorient themselves. In analyzing Brazilian spirit-possession rituals, I will characterize 
this re-orientation in terms of alternative conceptions of agency and intentionality. 
In sum, these four recent theoretical approaches to ritual jointly emphasize 
several valuable themes: ritualization (that which makes ritual distinct from non-ritual 
action); a correlated emphasis on the form and dynamics of ritual (as opposed to its 
meaning); a distinct relationship between intentionality and action (as compared to non-
ritual actions); a quality of authority that ritualized action gains in part due to this 
transformation of intentionality; a distinct field of social relations constituted within and 
by rituals; and the virtuality of the ritual sphere, autonomous and providing a space 
where participants reimagine themselves, especially their agency and intentionality. 
	   	  
Reactive and Objective Attitudes to Agency 
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Theorizing possession rituals in terms of the four theoretical insights above gives 
us a general starting point: ritual creates a social space, like and unlike that of non-ritual 
action, in which distinct forms of agency, characterized by the displacement of agency, 
play themselves out. The next step is to clarify how ritual agency is distinct. Houseman 
and Severi (1998: 231-232) critique Humphrey and Laidlaw’s idea that ritual action is 
non-intentional as being negative and residual. What does ‘non-intentional’ mean? It is 
not enough to simply assert that ritualized action is characterized by prior stipulation: 
that might make some sense of highly formalized and scripted rituals, like many in 
South India, but a more general approach to ritual needs to say something more concrete 
about the intentional/non-intentional distinction. There are types and degrees in the 
tempering or displacement of intentionality. Describing cases of how intentionality is 
transformed can clarify the relation between agency and ritual dynamics, presenting a 
spectrum of stances toward intentionality that ritual participants occupy and draw upon. 
 My main contribution in this article is to offer a conceptual distinction that 
shows promise in clarifying the senses of agency involved. It is an initial step, drawing 
on a specific set of cases, but with potential value more broadly. Brazilian spirit-
possession rituals offer a case where something quite specific seems to be going on, in 
terms of the types of agency of the various ritual participants. In this section, then, I 
propose a distinction between two attitudes toward the actions of oneself and others: the 
first recognizes a normal relation between intentionality and action; and the second 
responds to an abnormal quality of this relation.  
Philosopher Peter Strawson, in a classic essay, “Freedom and Resentment” 
(1976), argued for a middle ground on the thorny issue of free will vs. determinism by 
distinguishing two distinct attitudes toward agency. Strawson notes that our attitudes 
towards the actions of others, when these actions affect us directly, vary along a 
spectrum between two extremes. We adopt a ‘reactive’ attitude when we judge the 
actions of the person who has benefited or harmed us to have been intentional, willed, 
self-directed, etc. We adopt an ‘objective’ attitude to the extent that we judge that 
person to have acted unknowingly, unintentionally, or in some other manner outside 
their conscious control. In the former case, we experience the full range of appropriate 
emotional reactions (Strawson mentions gratitude but focuses on resentment). In the 
latter case, we acknowledge the person’s causal role, but we temper our reactions based 
on our judgment that the usual relation between intentionality and action has been 
somehow transformed.  
On this view, our attitudes toward the agency of others (and toward our own 
agency in hindsight) depend upon our evaluation of relations between action and 
intentionality, between agency and causality. In some cases, we recognize that people 
are not fully the agents of their actions. Strawson focuses on cases of the ‘not guilty by 
reason of insanity’ sort: 
 
the participant attitude, and the personal reactive attitudes in general, tend to 
give place, and it is judged by the civilized should give place, to objective 
attitudes, just in so far as the agent is seen as excluded from ordinary adult 
human relationships by deep-rooted, psychological abnormality (Strawson 1976; 
cf. Yearly 1985). 
 
Interestingly, he notes, in passing, examples comparable to possession rituals: 
 
we may think of such statements as ‘He wasn’t himself’, ‘He has been under 
very great strain recently’, ‘He was acting under post-hypnotic suggestion’…. 
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Such pleas as these do … invite us to suspend our ordinary reactive attitudes 
towards the agent, either at the time of his action or all the time. … They invite 
us to view the agent himself in a different light from the light in which we 
should normally view one who has acted as he has acted. I shall not linger over 
… [such] cases (Strawson 1976). 
 
I propose to do what Strawson did not, to linger over such cases, exploring the 
theoretical leverage that his distinction offers in the case of spirit possession.  
In general terms, religion is often closely associated with tensions between free 
and constrained action. More specifically, we can note that religion offers both cases 
where it is appropriate to adopt an objective attitude due to the non-intentionality of an 
agent, e.g., due to altered states of consciousness, and also cases where it is appropriate 
to adopt an objective attitude due normative constraints, e.g., where an agent is required 
to act according to moral or ritual codes.  
The distinction between reactive and objective attitudes is relevant to a broader 
range of cases than those that Strawson discusses. Because his focus is on issues of free 
will, responsibility, punishment, and moral condemnation, he examines only cases 
where the disconnect between intentionality and action, between agency and causality, 
is internal and non-stipulated. That is, he focuses on cases where the agent is free from 
morally relevant constraint except insofar as their intentionality becomes unhooked 
from their actions due to ignorance, immaturity, psychological problems, or altered 
states of consciousness. In this type of case, voluntary and willed actions are the norm, 
and involuntary and unwilled actions are abnormal. Hence, a reactive attitude is the 
norm and an objective attitude the exception. 
As a result, regarding this class of actions, Strawson’s distinction functions in 
two ways. First, it frames certain cases of human actions as abnormal, tempering or 
sustaining our normal responses and attitudes. This has clear implications in spheres 
like law, psychiatry and childrearing. In the case of religion, there are obvious cases 
where normal agentic link between intention and action is transformed in comparable 
ways. For example, in spirit possession it is appropriate to adopt an objective attitude 
toward the agency of the person who is possessed (though perhaps a reactive attitude to 
the spirit or other agent that is possessing the patient). However, the specific attitude—
from reactive to objective—that is seen as appropriate in such rituals will vary 
depending on a number of factors, including the type and degree of possession and a 
wide variety religious and social beliefs and practices. For example, the predominance 
of women as participants in ritual possession invokes complex and widely varying 
questions of agency and power that bear on judgments of praiseworthiness, blame, and 
the associated issues of status (see, e.g., Boddy 1994: 415-422; Rasmussen 1994; 
Caciola 2000; Chesnut 2003; Hayes, 2006). 
The second function of the distinction between reactive and objective attitudes is 
that the latter normalizes the former. That is, the existence of cases that invoke an 
objective attitude, of cases where we judge that people are not responsible for their 
actions, helps to delimit, define, normalize and naturalize cases of “normal” agency, i.e., 
where we adopt a reactive attitude. As Steven Yearley notes, in exploring the 
implications of Strawson’s distinction for legal and scientific reasoning, “in the law all 
explanations are concerned with making sense of departures from willing compliance 
with legal rules…. [C]orrect … [action] is treated as self-explanatory and thus in no 
need of special investigation” (Yearley 1985, 117-118). 
Strawson’s analysis meets his purposes. However, it can be enlarged in two 
ways for theory of ritual. First, we can take into account that agents form reactive and 
10	  
objective attitudes toward their own actions in retrospect. For example, it is appropriate 
to adopt an objective attitude toward our own action, as well as those of others, in cases 
of altered states of consciousness, in cases of moral or ritual obligation, or where 
individual agency is seen as radically subsumed under divine agency. Phrases like “In 
ša’ Allāh” or “God willing, for example,” mark beliefs that subtly displace reactive 
attitudes, sacralizing mundane contexts though this transformation: by delimiting our 
own agency, we emphasize God’s.  
Second, we can take account of another important and related category of cases, 
on that Strawson does not address given his interest. We adopt objective rather reactive 
attitudes in the face of others’ actions where those actions are previously stipulated or 
normatively constrained, for example, in cases of obeying the law, respecting moral 
rules or customs, keeping promises, carrying out bureaucratic processes, and, of course, 
performing rituals. (Recalling Humphrey and Laidlaw’s emphasis on prior stipulation 
and the resulting non-intentionality of ritual action, the relevance of Strawson’s 
distinction is obvious.) Our reactive attitudes are tempered when people are perceived 
as doing what they must or ought to do, as opposed to acting purely on the basis of their 
own unfettered intentionality. That is, we adopt objective attitudes to a greater or lesser 
extent when people act under various forms of normative constraint. That is, we find it 
harder to resent or praise someone who is simply following orders or just doing their 
job.  
Such cases are contrary to those that Strawson considers in an important sense. 
In the cases of non-intentionality that he considered, reactive attitudes were normal and 
objective attitudes exceptional. However, where actions are previously stipulated or 
normatively constrained, the opposite is true: acting according to these constraints, even 
against one’s will, is the norm, and acting freely and without constraint is less usual. A 
more objective attitude is the norm in the sort of cultural and institutional contexts that 
frame the bulk of our actions in society, and a more reactive attitude is the exception. To 
paraphrase Yearley, acting as normatively stipulated is self-explanatory and thus in no 
need of special investigation. Both the types of case discussed by Strawson and this 
second type associate the objective attitude with limitations on agency. In the case of 
non-intentional actions, emphasized by Strawson, reactive attitudes are suspended due 
to the involuntarily faulty agency of the actor. In the case of normatively constrained 
actions, as is often typical of religion, reactive attitudes are tempered due to the 
voluntary subordination of the actor’s independent agency to those norms. Strawson 
considers only the former case, but both are relevant to theory of ritual.  
In effect, Strawson proposes a linear model (see Figure 1a), in which the 
spectrum from reactive to objective attitudes is correlated with a distinction between 
freely chosen and fully intended actions, on the one hand, and actions characterized by 
non-intentionality on the other, i.e., a break between intention and action due to 
ignorance, psychological abnormality, etc. Taking into account previously stipulated or 
normatively constrained actions adds a second independent variable (see Figure 1b). As 
either the non-intentionality of an action or the normative constraints on it increases, so 
will our tendency to adopt an objective attitude toward it. 
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This distinction between attitudes toward agency has implications for our 
assessment of Humphrey and Laidlaw’s claim that ritualized action is characterized by 
non-intentionality. They are right to draw attention to the non-intentional character of 
ritual action, but this concept is too broad. By itself, non-intentionality fails to 
distinguish ritual action from the kinds of cases that Strawson draws our attention to 
(non-intentionality by virtue of faulty agency). Their additional claim that ritual action 
is stipulated and archetypal effectively sets it apart from those cases. However, as just 
noted, ritualized action is only one of various sorts of action characterized by normative 
constraints.  
Bloch’s concept of deference adds an important dimension. According to Bloch, 
ritual has three distinguishing characteristics. The first two are deference (i.e., “reliance 
on the authority of others to guarantee the value of what is said or done” [2006: 497]) 
and consciousness of deference. In the case of spirit possession, for example, “the act of 
deferral takes center stage, and everybody joins with … the medium in abandoning their 
intentionality and in making themselves transparent to whomever’s words they are 
quoting, which strangely fade out of focus” (Bloch 2006: 501). This far, Bloch covers 
much the same ground as Humphrey and Laidlaw’s criteria that ritual action is non-
intentional, stipulated and archetypal. His third criterion takes us further: “lack of clarity 
on the person to whom one is deferring” or “indetermination of the originating mind” 
(2006: 500, 502): 
 
The secret to the problem of wanting to locate meaning without having normal 
originators of that meaning is to merge all the shadowy transparent figures into 
Non-
intentionality 
Reactive 
Normative 
Constraints	  
Objective Reactive 
Figure 1b. Objective attitudes to agency as a function of normative 
constraints. 
Figure 1a. Objective attitudes to agency as a function of non-
intentionality. 
Objective 
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one phantasmagoric quasi-person who may be called something like ‘tradition’, 
‘the ancestors as a group’, ‘our way of doing things’, ‘our ‘spirit’, our ‘religion’, 
perhaps even ‘God’ (Bloch 2006: 502, 504). 
 
On Bloch’s account, “deference is a common aspect of human life,” but ritual is 
distinctive because it “involves high degrees of deference”: “Rituals are orgies of 
conscious deference” (Bloch 2006: 505-506). The emphasis on the consciousness of 
deference and the link between non-intentionality and the legitimation of authority are 
valuable additions. However, the concept of deference also fails to adequately 
distinguish ritual from non-ritual. Ethical and customary norms share these same 
qualities of conscious indeterminate deference, in a manner that often displaced onto 
tradition and supernatural beings. These examples are arguably within the fold of 
religion, but they are less arguably cases of ritual. 
The distinction between reactive and objective attitudes toward agency allows us 
to take a further step forward. My suggestion is that Strawson’s concept of the objective 
attitude offers a more effective way to characterize those aspects of ritualized action that 
Humphrey and Laidlaw analyze in terms of non-intentionality and Bloch in terms of 
deference.  
One of the advantages of bringing the distinction between reactive and objective 
attitudes into dialogue with recent theory of ritual is that it offers richer resources for 
making sense of participant attitudes toward the agency that they and others exercise. It 
is important to distinguish between cases where participants see intentions linked 
‘normally’ to ritualized action and those where they do not. This is so even where 
scholars of religion might argue that both cases are non-intentional. 
It is significant that Staal and Humphrey and Laidlaw drew on highly formalized 
south Asian rituals as examples in order to conclude that issues of meaning and 
intentionality are independent from ritual form. (Laidlaw and Humphrey acknowledge 
that “performance-centred” rituals require the extension of their analysis of non-
intentionality [2006: 282].) On the one hand, these examples offer the advantage of 
rigid ritual form, facilitating the comparative analysis of this form’s relation to other 
aspects of ritualized action. On the other hand, these examples occlude the importance 
of ritual dynamics, of improvisation and individual variation, of choices between 
alternative possible forms, of spontaneous invention, and of negotiation between ritual 
participants. It is relatively easy to see what their claim that ritual is non-intentional 
means with the highly formalized examples that they draw upon. It is less easy to make 
sense of this claim in the case of less formalized rituals or where comparable ritual 
elements are present in cases that vary in their degree of formalization. To respond that 
non-intentionality is a characteristic only of formalized and pre-scripted ritual would 
miss much of importance. The distinction between reactive and objective attitudes can 
characterize a fuller range of types of non-intentionality. 
The distinction between reactive and objective attitudes not only allows us to 
further specify Humphrey and Laidlaw concept of non-intentionality and Bloch’s 
concept of deference, it intersects with Houseman and Severi’s claim that ritual 
performance is “an enactment of exceptional relationships,” i.e., that “the symbolic 
‘work’ of the rite … consists in the establishment, on the basis of existing relations, of a 
new relationship” (Houseman 2006: 420; Houseman and Severi 1998: xiv). The 
distinction between reactive and objective attitudes allows us to specify one important 
manner in which normal social relations are evoked or echoed but, at the same time, 
transformed or displaced within ritual. It also clarifies an important dimension of ritual 
virtuality according to Kapferer’s analysis. By transforming what would be a reactive 
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attitude in a non-ritual context to an objective reaction in ritual, or vice versa, ritualized 
action opens up a complex field for modeling alternative and variations on a key aspect 
of social relations, our ascriptions of intentional agency to others and ourselves. 
 
Indexicality, Distributed Agency, and Ritual Dynamics 
 
This section of the article argues that the indexicality of certain ritual elements 
contributes to the transformation of reactive to objective attitudes. Attempts to theorize 
ritual based on models of linguistic communication have emphasized the symbolic 
function of ritual elements, but this approach is limited and distracting. In asking what a 
ritual “means,” we interpret its elements against the broader religious and cultural 
background that gives meaning to these signs or symbols. This always leads us beyond 
ritualized action itself to its alleged backdrop of signification. In semiotic terms, given 
that symbols mean what they mean because of linguistic and cultural conventions, we 
are led to analyze ritual as a token whose type lies beyond the ritual context itself. 
Indexes are signs whose meaning is inseparable from their specific context. The word 
“this,” for example, is an indexical expression, because it serves as a pointer, and, as 
such, its specific meaning is inseparable from the context within which it points at 
something. As a result, the concept of indexicality turns our attention toward, rather 
than beyond, the ritualized actions themselves. One of the main weaknesses of the 
model of ritual as linguistic communication is that is loses sight of the specificity of 
ritual. The main advantage of analyzing certain ritual elements as indices is that this 
focus on ‘thisness’ allows us to make better sense of ritual efficacy and dynamics. 
A useful theoretical foil for clarifying the place of indexicality in ritual is Alfred 
Gell’s theory of art, in his Art and Agency (1998; see Layton 2003; Bowden 2004). His 
theory is based on the agency of art not on its aesthetic or communicative aspects: art is 
“a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic 
propositions about it” (Gell 1998: 6). For Gell, artworks are effective mediators of 
social agency because they motivate viewers to make abductions of agency: “Any 
object that one encounters in the world invites the question ‘how did this thing get to be 
here?’” (Gell 1998: 67). As a result, art works embody a form of “distributed agency” 
that both acts on its own and points toward its originating agency. Gell’s points about 
agency can be extended to other objects besides art objects: “Agency can be ascribed to 
‘things’ without this giving rise to anything particularly recalling the production and 
circulation of ‘art’” (Gell 1998: 23).  
In Gell’s theory, the concept of agency is closely linked to the indexicality of art 
objects. Here he draws on Charles Sanders Peirce’s distinction between icon, symbol 
and index. An icon refers by exemplifying, exhibiting or sharing a similar structure as 
its object. Architectural drawings or onomatopoeic words are icons in this sense. A 
symbol refers to its object by virtue of cultural and linguistic conventions. An 
interpretant (i.e., the person who interprets) understands that the word “red” refers to a 
certain colour by applying a conventional rule that associates the two. The concept of 
the index is more complex. It is generally spelled out in terms of a causal relation 
between object and sign. Smoke is an index of fire and boot prints in the snow are an 
index of the recent presence of a human being. A classic statement defines the three as 
follows:  
 
an icon is an object which takes on its sign character by reason of its 
resemblance to its object; the symbol is a sign whose connection with its object 
is merely associational and conventional; and the index is a sign which is really, 
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dynamically, and even causally connected with what it serves to indicate (Moore 
et al. 1942: 367). 
 
The three categories of index, icon and symbol are not mutually exclusive: a given sign 
can be more than one (Burks 1949; García-Carpintero 1998: 532). 
The use of indexical expressions has been richly developed in two main areas of 
study, analytic philosophy and ethnomethodology, with philosophers emphasizing that 
the truth-value of indexicals depends on their context and ethnomethodologists argues 
that their meaning does (Barnes and Law 1976: 224). They hold the basic point in 
common: it is impossible to say what indexical expressions like “this is new,” “it is 
raining now,” or “I am hungry” refer to unless we know the specific pragmatic context 
in which the sentence was uttered (Bar-Hillel 1954). At issue here is the degree to which 
it is possible to arrive at any understanding of language extracted from its context.2 The 
main implication for ritual theory is this emphasis on context. Gell’s perspective is 
limited, in part, because he drew to a very limited extent on these two rich sets of 
literature. 
Gell emphasizes the causal and non-linguistic aspects of the index, highlighting 
the relevance of the concept to his proposed link between agency and art objects.  
He writes that an index is a “‘natural sign’ … from which the observer can make a 
causal inference of some kind, or an inference about the intentions of capabilities of 
another person” (1998: 13). Jens Kreinath further specifies aspects of the index in 
arguing that the concept of the index (and Gell’s work specifically) is relevant for ritual 
theory, in part because it allows to makes inferences about the intentionality of ritual 
participants: “It is characteristic of indexes that they not only function as vectors in 
causal relations but that they are also self-referential and therefore capable of causal 
inference that allows to build hypotheses about the intentions or capacities of other 
persons” (2006: 468-469). On this view, four aspects of the index emerge as especially 
relevant in extending Gell’s theory of art to theory of ritual: a causal relation between 
object and sign; the material nature of this causal relation; the non-linguistic character 
of the sign; and the particularity of this direct form of reference.  
Of these four characteristics that appear to bridge Gell’s theory of art and theory 
of ritual, the first three can be interpreted more broadly. This allows us to gain insights 
from Gell’s work, avoiding some of the points for which he has been criticized, and to 
integrate these insights with recent theory of ritual in a productive manner. That is, I 
argue that it is productive to view the relation between index and object as not 
necessarily causal, material or non-linguistic.  
This is not to suggest that it is wrong to interpret Peirce in this triply narrow 
manner. This view is one of many consistent with Peirce’s complex writings on the 
matter. These and other aspects of the index are found in his fragmented and sometimes 
contradictory writings on semiotics:3 
 
• A causal connection between object and sign: “An Index is a sign which refers 
to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is arguable that indexical representations have played a central role in the evolutionary emergence of 
domain-specific cognitive mechanisms oriented to solving recurrent adaptive problems (Clarke 1996). 
There is an implicit link here between the view I argue for and cognitive theories of ritual. 
3 All citations are from the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms 
<www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html>. Complete references are available there. 
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• Materiality of that relation: “The index is physically connected with its 
object….” 
• More broadly than just a causal relation, “real connections” or “a genuine 
Relation” between sign and object: “really and in its individual existence 
connected with the individual object”; “a sign of its object by virtue of being 
connected with it as a matter of fact.” 
• A corollary of this sort of relation, contiguity: “the index, … like a pronoun 
demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular object intended 
without describing it”; “An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, having 
thisness, and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity 
and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called a 
hecceity.” 
• A quality of grabbing the attention: “A sign which denotes a thing by forcing it 
upon the attention is called an index”; “an index … is a sign of its object by 
virtue of … forcibly intruding upon the mind, quite regardless of its being 
interpreted as a sign.”; indices “direct the attention to their objects by blind 
compulsion.” 
 
Gell’s appeal to the concept of indexicality reflects his specific concerns with 
the agency of art objects. He want to frees the anthropology of art from an excessively 
relativistic concern with culture, and he want to link the specific form of causality 
implicit in the case of artifacts to the issue of agency. This leads him to interpret Peirce 
narrowly, interpreting the index in causal, material and non-linguistic terms.  
A focus on theory of ritual leads us to broaden the concept of indexicality in 
each of these manners, emphasizing four themes from Peirce’s account of the index. 
First, the relation between index and object can be one of contiguity (real and 
existential) in addition to one of causality. A pointing finger is an index by virtue of 
contiguity not cause. Second, it follows that this relation does not necessarily require a 
“material imprint” (Kreinath 2006: 468). Third, the category of index includes linguistic 
signs, as implied by Peirce’s reference to pronouns and developed extensively in the 
subsequent philosophical literature. Fourth, it is important to take account of the 
attention-grabbing quality of indices.  
The following analysis draws on three specific senses of this enlarged concept of 
indexicality. First, a variety of interjections and alterations in tone of voice are 
characteristic of spirit possession. This type of index includes linguistic signs and is 
informed by relations of contiguity more broad than those of causality. 
Ethnomethodologists have noted the complex nature of this indexical function: 
 
Interjections are primarily indexical … in that they stand for their objects by a 
relationship of contiguity rather than by a relationship of convention (as in the 
case of symbols) or similarity (as in the case of icons). … interjections may 
index more than one object at once. In particular, they may index objects, signs, 
internal states, and social relations (Kockelman 2003, 471). 
 
For example, “wow” or “yikes” can index emotions; “hi” or “good riddance” can index 
the nature of the social relationship between interlocutors; and “knock on wood” and 
“God willing” can index attitudes toward agency. In spirit possession, the meaning of 
certain elements of the ritual is not fleshed out in relation to some external backdrop of 
cultural meaning. They mark the presence of an altered agency: here, now, in this 
person, at this moment.  
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Second, the messages received by mediums, and passed on in oral or written 
form, and the objects that are blessed by the spirits also function as indices of 
supernatural agency. Here we are close to Gell’s analysis, with the exception that these 
indices are not exclusively material artifacts but also linguistic and conceptual. 
To make sense of this second category of ritual indexicals, it is useful to engage 
another aspect of Gell’s theory, his concept of distributed agency. In his view, art 
objects are secondary agents, acting as indices of their creators agency. An agent, 
according to Gell, is any “thing” (e.g. a person or object) “who is seen as initiating 
causal sequences of a particular type, that is, events caused by acts of mind or will or 
intention” (1998: 16; cf. 17, 19). This focus on agenct as intentional cause allows Gell 
to extend the concept to include the agency of objects: 
 
Agency is attributable to those persons (and things)…) who/which are seen as 
initiating causal sequences… events caused by acts of mind or will or 
intention…. An agent is the source, the origin, of causal events, independently of 
the state of the physical universe (Gell 1998: 16). 
 
This contrasts with other influential views of agency. Anthony Giddens, for 
example, includes a contrafactual element that is missing in Gell’s account: “agency 
concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual 
could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens 
1984: 9). Giddens focuses on the process on agency, with its various phases of decision-
making, intentionality, will and action in the face of potential external limitations and 
constraints. Gell focuses on the endpoints of agency, on the initial cause and the result. 
In his paradigmatic case, the former is inferred (or abducted) from the latter, i.e., from 
the presence of material artifacts. Giddens looks at agency from the inside; Gell looks at 
agency from the outsider’s perspective, analyzing cases after the fact from the agentic 
signs that they present to us. For this reason, Gell’s conception is less appropriate for 
the philosopher and the sociologist, but perhaps more appropriate for the anthropologist 
and the student of ritual. 
This sort of external approach to the concept of agency is helpful for making 
sense of religious agents. That is, by focuses on what acts like an agent rather than what 
thinks like an agent, we bring the concept of agency to bear on the sorts of agency that 
play important roles in religious contexts. Ronald Inden argues that gods are agents 
“whose very existence may be contested … [but who] may in a sense be real. … We 
may take such agents to be real to the extent that complexes of discursive and 
nondiscursive practices constitute and perpetuate them” (1990, 27). 
William S. Sax connects this sort of distributed agency explicitly to the functions 
of ritual: “Ritual is the point at which the agency distributed among other persons, 
relationships, and social institutions is articulated and made manifest. … [P]ublic ritual 
is precisely the point at which complex agency is articulated and confirmed” (Sax 2006: 
481, 478). This point that Sax makes is central to my argument. Agency is extended, 
transformed, displaced and naturalized through the ritualization of action. Specifically, I 
argue that altering the relations between reactive and objective attitudes to agency are 
one way in which supernatural agency is recognized or constituted. Supernatural agency 
emerges through the cracks that ritual creates in our ‘normal’ perceptions of human 
agency. 
In this light, Gell’s concept of distributed agency draws our attention to two 
points that are relevant to the indexicality of ritual. First, objects are seen as having 
effects that are independent of the direct actions of their originator. It is in this sense 
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that artworks have distributed agency: the agency of the artist acts secondarily, in a 
mediated fashion, through these artifacts. Second, because this distributed agency stands 
at a distance from its originator, we are forced to postulate the identity of that 
originating agency using a process of abduction. Gell notes, “Any object that one 
encounters in the world invites the question ‘how did this thing get to be here?’” (Gell 
1998: 67). It is precisely at this point that altered perceptions of agency can displace the 
postulate of an original human agent onto that of divine agency.  
To sum up this second extension of indexicality beyond Gell, the concept of 
distributed agency offers a valuable means for explaining the power of artifacts and 
other material elements of ritual, as well as many of the discursive and conceptual 
products of ritualized action. On the one hand, this point to the perceived affects that 
ritual agents, human or supernatural, can have, effects that can extend outward into the 
world more broadly through the secondary agency embodied in ritual products. On the 
other hand, this very extension, from original human agent to sites of distributed 
agency, creates a gap into within which divine agency can be perceived or constituted. 
The third sense of an enlarged concept of indexicality that is relevant to the case 
of ritual is the fact that, as Peirce noted, indices grab our attention. Gell makes a similar 
point when he argues that art objects are captivating: “they are difficult to make, 
difficult to ‘think’, difficult to transact. They fascinate, compel, and entrap as well as 
delight the spectator” (Gell 1998: 23). However, Gell does not link this fascination 
clearly to the concept of indexicality itself.  
It is not a coincidence that the same is said of spirit possession: “possession 
continues to hold the anthropological gaze despite heroic attempts to tame it, render it 
harmless or understood” (Boddy 1994: 407). Vincent Crapanzano underlines this 
compelling quality of spirit possession: “‘Fascination’ captures the magic, the demonic 
power, of possession itself…” (Crapanzo 2006: 200-201). The parallel between the 
fascination of the art object and the fascination of possession is that both force us to ask 
questions about the agency that lies behind what we see before us. I argue that 
possession is fascinating in large part due to its superposition and transformation of 
reactive and objective attitudes. We see someone, perhaps a neighbor or relative, in 
action, but we are forced, by the ritualized nature of that action, to alter or our attitude 
toward this manifestation of human agency.  
This transformation of the balance between these two attitudes to agency plays a 
role in the constitution of the sacred. Reactive attitudes are displaced in ritual: we react 
naturally, but this reaction cannot be attached to the ritual actor, toward whom we adopt 
an objective attitude. The postulated supernatural agents often serve as the objects of 
these displaced reactive attitudes. Where Houseman and Severi draw attention to 
exceptional relations, I argue that it is our exception reactions, in part constituted by 
these incommensurable social relations, which are more significant. Ritual invokes a 
disjunction, as our attitudes to agency are evoked but displaced. 
 To sum up, Gell proposes two useful concepts: indexicality and distributed 
agency. Making sense of ritual requires interpreting indexicality in a broader sense than 
Gell does: including linguistic phenomena, such as interjections; recognizing that divine 
agency can emerge from the gap between original human agents and sites of distributed 
agency; and the fascination that is evoked, in part, by the perceived disjunction that is 
produced in our perceptions of agency when it is transformed, displaced, or distributed. 
 One of Gell’s goals in invoking the concept of the index was to distance the 
anthropology of art from its emphasis on cultural context. According to Peirce, the 
symbol can only be read by paying attention to the broad cultural conventions that 
constitute its meaning, but the index has a real, existential link to a specific context. 
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However, extending the concept of the index beyond a narrow view focused on causal 
and material relations brings culture back into the equation. For example, interjections 
are indexicals, but part of their meaning is governed by conventions: a “wow!” by any 
other name is not necessarily a “wow!” Gell’s view of indices is simply untenable in its 
radical departure from culture and convention. Ethnomethodologists classify indices as 
“deictic tokens,” and analyzing the cultural context of these context-driven signs is one 
of their stocks in trade: “The anchoring of deictic tokens to a specific time and place 
relies on cultural expectations that organize their salience” (Duranti 1997: 352).  
The final two sections of this article explores a specific set of indexicals, signs of 
altered agency in Brazilian spirit possession rituals, and it argues that the work of these 
ritual elements reflects a very specific set of cultural expectations. This is intended to 
accomplish the two overarching goals of this contribution to ritual theory: to set out 
concepts that offer a broad applicability in other contexts, while making it possible to 
take account of specific social and cultural contexts. 
 
Virtuality, indexicality and attitudes to agency in Kardecism and Umbanda 
 
This final section illustrates the value of the theoretical approach outlined above by 
analyzing spirit possession in Kardecism and Umbanda. From the perspective of ritual 
theory, the key task set out by this brief overview of two Brazilian religions is to explain 
the ritual differences. A further challenge is to propose a theoretical frame that draws on 
the strengths of recent important work in ritual theory.  
The distinction between reactive and objective attitudes offers important insights 
into spirit possession, in part because it highlights the need to analyze the details of 
possession in specific religious and social contexts. As Houseman and Severi suggest, 
ritualized action constitutes special relationships. Here I offer a specific account of what 
this means in this particular ritual context: the pervasive patron-client relationships of 
Brazilian society are echoed and transformed in these rituals. Specifically, I argue that 
the relation between reactive and objective attitudes is altered in these contexts. The 
sacralizing function of a shift between reactive and objective attitudes constitutes a key 
dimension of the rituals’ virtuality, of their capacity to allow participants to re-imagine, 
redirect, and reorient their capacity for agency with respect to the everyday 
circumstances of life.  
Possession rituals transform attitudes toward agency in three ways. (Recall that a 
reactive attitude reflects a judgment that others’ agency is normal, above all, intentional; 
an objective attitude reflects a judgment that their actions are not entirely their own.) 
First, an objective attitude toward the medium who is possessed replaces the reactive 
attitude that holds toward this member of one’s community outside the ritual context. 
This shift from reactive to objective attitudes is based on the non-intentionality of the 
medium’s agency and it is marked by certain indexicals. Second, as a corollary, reactive 
attitudes are displaced onto a supernatural patron, the possessing spirit, who acts more 
generously and less self-interestedly than is the case with the normal patron-client 
relationship. The messages that are conveyed by mediums, both oral and written, and 
the objects blessed by the spirits and later circulated function as indices of that altered 
agency. At this point, Gell’s analysis is particularly appropriate. The particular tension 
between reactive and objective attitudes here depends on the specific character of 
Brazilian society, a reminder of the need for ritual theory to take social and cultural 
contexts into account. Third, the clients’ attitude toward their own actions, during and 
as a direct result of the ritual, shifts toward the objective. This shift from reactive to 
objective attitudes is based on the normative constraints that inhere in the ritual process. 
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In all three cases, the indexicality of certain ritual elements is essential to unhooking 
reactive responses like gratitude from the reciprocity that governs non-ritual social 
relations. In general, the virtuality of spirit possession in Kardecism and Umbanda 
models a more functional set of patronage relations that are leveraged free from 
constraining links of reciprocity. 
Various aspects of possession rituals in Umbanda and Kardecism illustrate the 
role of indexicals in prompting a shift toward objective attitudes regarding the medium: 
dramatic gestures, sudden movements, eye rolling, and sharp cries mark the moment of 
possession, more so toward the Afro end of Umbanda; the spirits’ ‘horses’ often have a 
distinctive rolling gait in rituals at the Afro-Brazilian end of Umbanda’s spectrum of 
ritual forms; changes in tone and pacing of voice mark possession; more specifically, 
guttural interjections are characteristic of the manner in which possessed mediums 
speak in Umbanda; distinctions between these guttural interjections gives evidence of 
different types of spirits, e.g., caboclos and pretos velhos; the hushed and attentive 
response of non-participants/clients also marks specific points in the ritual that are 
characterized by the presence/agency of spirits. 
These signs are all indexical in that they are caused by or contiguous with the 
possession process. As such they point to an alteration in the agency of the medium. 
That is, these indexicals are the basis on which the non-participants/clients make 
judgments about the nature of agency manifested by the medium, informing a shift of 
attitude from reactive to objective. The judgment results in the medium having the 
status of an artwork, in terms of Gell’s analysis, i.e., an object, a site of distributed 
agency, that forces us to search for an originary agency behind it. The postulate of a 
supernatural agent follows: clients face what appears to be an agent yet have strong 
reasons to believe that the person before them is not acting normally; the obvious 
conclusion is that an occluded agent is acting through them. What this article adds is a 
clarification of the relation between two attitudes to agency that inform this reaction. 
As noted above, Gell’s attempt to sidestep the cultural contingency that shapes 
the interpretation of indexicals fails. I suggest that the prominence of spirit possession 
in Brazil is a function of the fact that the general function of ritual that I point to, 
altering relations between attitudes to agency, resonates more strongly with attitudes to 
agency that are common within Brazilian society as a whole.  
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The threshold at which reactive attitudes shift to objective attitudes differs 
between cultures (Figures 2a and 2b). In Brazil, the scope of one’s agency in the non-
domestic sphere is more limited than is generally the case, for example, in North 
America or Western Europe. As a result, objective attitudes are more often appropriate. 
Along the “non-intentionality” axis in Figures 2a and 2b, the popular sense grants a 
great scope of non-intentionality; the point at which one is no longer responsible for 
what has happened. This reflects the fact that bureaucratic and other public systems are 
inefficient, irrational and, on occasion, corrupt, leading to a correlated reliance on 
personal relations (Buarque de Holanda, 1999: 139-151; Queiroz 1976: 33-159; 
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Figure 2a. Objective attitudes to agency as a function of 
non-intentionality and normative constraints 
(Canada/U.S.A.).	  
Figure 2b. Objective attitudes to agency as a function of 
non-intentionality and normative constraints (Brazil). 
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DaMatta 1983).4 It also reflects a correlated belief that a variety of spirits obstruct one’s 
efforts. Belief in spirit possession is widely held, especially among the lower classes. 
Encostos are believed to be very common. These are mildly harmful spirits that 
obstruct, distract, hinder, cause illnesses, etc. (interpreted in Kardecism as mild cases of 
obsession). Self-help programs on Brazilian television discuss encostos where Oprah 
and Dr. Phil would be discussing dysfunctional self-image. Along the “normative 
constraints” axis in Figures 2a and 2b, the reverse is true. Because confidence in 
impersonal system is justifiably low, those who would be perceived, in Canada and the 
USA, as normatively constrained are, in Brazil, more often seen as having the latitude, 
if they so desire, to dar um jeito (“find a way”) (Barbosa 2006). As a result, the ritual 
shift in attitudes toward agency comes easier. It reflects the relational tensions between 
reactive and objective attitudes in Brazilian society more closely. In Brazil, it is easier 
and more ‘natural’ to adopt an objective attitude toward a medium, displacing one’s 
reactive attitude onto a postulated supernatural being. 
This perspective allows us to take one step toward making sense of a key ritual 
difference between Kardecism and Umbanda. The two religions exhibit important 
differences in the social make-up of practitioners: Kardecists are more likely white, 
middle-class, and well educated; Umbandists more likely to be pardo or black, poor, 
and poorly educated. That is, Kardecists have, on average, significantly more social and 
economic capital within Brazilian society. Within Umbanda, with its spectrum of ritual 
forms, a homologus tensions exists between “white” and Afro forms (Engler 
forthcoming). The fact that the rituals in Umbanda at the “white” end of the spectrum 
more closely resemble Kardecism is correlated with higher middle-class and white 
participation. In terms of the theoretical frame proposed here, practitioners of the two 
religions are rehearsing and reorienting different tensions between reactive and 
objective attitudes toward agency, correlated with their ability to wield social capital. 
That is, the virtuality of rituals rehearse and model different social landscapes in the two 
cases.  
A key ritual difference is correlated with this social difference: Kardecist 
mediums remain conscious of and largely in control of the presence of the spirits they 
receive; Umbandist mediums enter an unconscious trance state and are more likely to 
require subsidiary rituals to free them from the spirit that has possessed them. Because 
of their class and status locations within Brazilian society, Kardecists are more like 
North Americans in terms of the culturally predicated attitudes toward agency that they 
bring to the ritual table. The less radical displacement of reactive attitudes reflect the 
fact that Kardecists are less likely to be accustomed to adopting an objective attitude 
toward their own agency.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Agency is constrained or facilitated by our attitudes toward it, and these vary across 
cultures, classes, and other social boundaries. As Gell notes, agency is “a culturally 
prescribed framework for thinking about causation, when what happens is (in some 
vague sense) supposed to be intended in advance by some person-agent or thing-agent” 
(Gell 1998: 17). In this light, a focus on the virtuality of ritual—its creation of spaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Of course, Brazil’s impersonal systems are inefficient and its personal systems efficient only by 
comparison, generally to Western Europe and English-speaking North America. It is important not to 
jump to the conclusion that these factors are necessarily correlated with, much less the cause of, a 
‘backward’ or ‘deficient’ modernity in Brazil (Souza 1999). 
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for rehearsing alternative attitudes toward agency—offers a theoretical framework for 
analyzing ritualized action in a manner responsive to cultural specificity.  
The elements of a theoretical approach sketched here are not meant to be 
complete or exclusive. The indexicality of ritual (or formal aspects of ritual more 
generally) are not determinative or solely responsible for shaping people conceptions of 
and attitudes to agency. Nor are reactive and objective attitudes to agency exclusive of 
or more important than a variety of other factors. For example, the notion of person in 
Kardecism is distinct from that of Umbanda in its emphasis on rational agency and the 
modification of individual behaviour (Cavalcanti 1983). This religious anthropology 
might well play a greater role in shaping attitudes to agency that the elements of ritual 
form that I have focused upon. 
It might seem overly functionalist or reductionist to suggest that these rituals can 
frame functional and even strategic displacements of intentionality. This would appear 
to fly in the face of Kapferer’s denial that ritual is “a coded symbolic formation whose 
interpretation or meaning is ultimately reducible to the sociopolitical and psychological 
world outside the ritual context” (Kapferer 2004: 46; cf. 2002: 118). Kapferer’s 
insistence on the automony of ritual takes a healthy step back from overly reductionist 
approaches. At the same time, he is often too stark in arguing for the independence of 
ritual from the social field of non-ritual: “the virtual of ritual is a thoroughgoing reality 
of its own, neither a simulacrum of realities external to ritual nor an alternative reality” 
(Kapferer 2004: 37). His core insight, that rituals allow participants to “reimagine (and 
redirect or reorient themselves) in the everyday circumstances of life” would make no 
sense if the space created by the ritual bore no relation to the non-ritual sphere 
(Kapferer 2006: 673-674). It is the dynamic tension between like and unlike that allows 
the virtuality of ritual “to realize human constructive agency” (Kapferer 2004: 47).  
The approach I sketch could be used as part of narrowly (and indefensibly) 
functionalist or reductionist arguments. I point rather to correlations between attitudes 
to agency in the ritual sphere and non-ritual spheres, suggest that elements of ritual form 
contribute to this relation of like and un-like, and argue that these correlations vary to 
some extent by culture and class. Brazilian spirit-possession rituals do not simply echo 
or reflect broader cultural factors; they also allow ritual participants to reimagine and 
rehearse dynamic conceptions of and attitudes to the agency of themselves and others; 
and this has implications outside of the ritual context. The indexicality of rituals, in part, 
both influences and reflects changes in attitudes to agency; and this constitutes an 
important element of the virtuality of the rituals. Given their virtual framing of attitudes 
to agency and intentionality, rituals could potentially do several sorts of work for 
individuals and groups: adapting or dislocating participants from their broader social 
context; preparing them for more effective non-ritual agency or compensating for its 
lack; reflecting, distorting, critiquing, romanticizing social reality. The extent to which 
any given set of rituals performs these or other functions is a largely empirical issue, 
one not addressed here. It would be one-sided and limiting to analyze rituals solely in 
terms of their offering psychological compensation to those whose social position 
leaves them with hampered agency in ‘real’ life: in terms of the present analysis, by 
shifting participants’ views of structural constraints from dysfunctionally reactive to 
functionally objective, reorienting attitudes to agency in relation to structural norms. 
This may well be an important part of the story, but other possibilities should also be 
considered: e.g., that religious rituals can constitute a social space within which altered 
attitudes to agency are correlated with distinct status markers. 
In substantive terms, I argue that Brazilian spirit-possession rituals create a 
virtual space where participants work out alternative senses of agency and 
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intentionality, and these latter bear certain relations to the broader field of Brazilian 
social relations. The distinct attitudes to agency that are prevalent in Brazilian society 
make spirit possession more effective in two senses of that word. First, the rituals 
succeed in evoking or constituting the sacred more effectively because their 
displacement of reactive attitudes comes more easily to those who are more used to 
making this mental move. Second, the rituals offer a space for the rehearsal of a type of 
attitude adjustment that is functional in Brazilian society in a way that it is not in 
Canadian or American society: it is useful to recognize when others are not able to act 
fully as agents and to displace one’s reactive attitudes toward figures that hold positions 
that allow them to function as patrons.  
My theoretical claim is a limited one: that certain formal aspects of ritual offer 
cues that help constitute a virtual space for participants, within which culturally-specific 
relations between reactive and objective attitudes can be modified. Cultural and socio-
economic factors, as well as religious conceptions of the self as agent, inform the 
relevant aspects of ritual dynamics. This basic approach could be extended to analyze 
other dimensions of relations between ritual form and conceptions of agency and 
intentionality.  
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